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In Article I of the Constitution, the Framers vest the legislative 
authority of the United States government in a bicameral Congress, 
and over the ten sections of the Article they systematically flesh out 
the structure, duties, and powers of that Congress. In the early sections 
of Article I they describe the membership of each House, giving life to 
the “Great Compromise” of the Constitutional Convention under 
which each state has equal representation in the Senate but population-
based representation in the House of Representatives. In Section 5, 
they grant Congress the power to govern itself. 
Section 5 consists of four separate clauses, each of which addresses 
different practical aspects of legislative procedure. 
The first Clause of Section 5 begins by bestowing on each House the 
power to “[j]udge” the elections of its own members. After the Civil 
War there were heated disputes about seating Senators from former 
Confederate states. But in the modern era, this provision comes into 
play when there is a challenge to the state-declared winner of an 
election to the Senate or House. Losing candidates dissatisfied with 
state recount procedures may petition the relevant chamber of 
Congress to decide the outcome. These high stakes determinations are 
immune from judicial review.     
Legislative recounts can be bitterly partisan. For example, a House 
task force took months to review the 1984 election in Indiana’s 
“Bloody Eighth” district, and GOP members walked out of the 
chamber in protest when Democrat Frank McCloskey was declared 
the winner over Republican Richard McIntyre by four votes out of 
233,000 cast. In 1974, the Governor of New Hampshire certified that 
Republican Louis Wyman won a Senate seat by two votes. Democrat 
John Durkin sought redress in the Senate. Having conducted its own 
recount, the Senate Rules Committee reported a resolution that would 
have seated Durkin, but the resolution died in the face of implacable 
Republican opposition. Seven months into the new Congress, the 
Senate declared the seat vacant and sent the matter back to New 
Hampshire for a fresh election.  
While the House and Senate may decide contested elections, they may 
not disqualify otherwise duly elected persons who meet Constitutional 
qualifications for membership. The House sought to do just that when 
the flamboyant Adam Clayton Powell won re-election to a New York 
seat. The Supreme Court held that a House of Congress may expel a 
member (by a two-thirds majority), but cannot exclude him for pre-
election conduct. Powell v. McCormack(1969). 
The same sentence in this Clause provides that “a majority of each 
[House] shall constitute a quorum to do business.” Other than roll-call 
voting, most business in the chambers occurs with only a handful of 
members in attendance. But at any time any member may question the 
presence of a quorum, triggering a “quorum call.” During a Senate 
quorum call, the clerk calls the names of every member to tally 
attendance. In most cases, the quorum call merely fills gaps between 
other Senate activities and is not intended to produce an actual 
quorum. When the Senate is ready to proceed to its business, the 
quorum call will typically be cut short by unanimous consent. 
Neither chamber can conduct business without a quorum, but the 
Supreme Court long ago held that each House determines whether a 
quorum is present when a bill passes. Article I, Section 5 contemplates 
the compelled attendance of absent members, a device rarely utilized 
in the modern Congress. 
The second Clause of Section 5 states that “Each House may 
determine the Rules of its Proceedings.” This is an important 
provision because legislative rules often influence substantive 
outcomes. For example, the House Rules Committee determines 
which amendments may be offered to particular bills, thus shaping the 
debate on and ultimate content of legislation. Precedents interpreting 
Senate rules dictate preferential recognition of the Majority Leader 
over other Senators, a significant advantage for the Leader in setting 
the chamber’s agenda.  
Senate Rule 22 is a high-profile example of the power of legislative 
rulemaking. That rule establishes a three-fifths threshold (rather than a 
simple majority) to invoke “cloture” and thereby limit debate. In 
recent years, each party has accused the other of abusing the right of 
extended debate. Leaders of both parties threatened to change Rule 22 
unilaterally to insulate certain questions from the super-majority 
requirement of cloture. A Republican threat to utilize this co-called 
“nuclear option” failed to materialize in 2005. Eight years later, 
Democrats who had opposed the nuclear option when they were in the 
minority successfully invoked it when they were in the majority to 
speed confirmation of nominees. Meanwhile litigation brought to 
challenge the constitutionality of Rule 22 failed because the 
Constitution explicitly reserves questions of Congressional self-
governance to the Senate and House themselves. See, e.g., Common 
Cause v. Biden (D.C. Cir. 2014).   
This second Clause also gives each legislative chamber the power to 
“punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the 
concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.” In all of American 
history, only five House members and twenty Senators (most during 
the Civil War era) have been expelled from Congress, but many more 
have been punished with censure or reprimand for ethical misconduct. 
Most recently, James Traficant of Ohio was expelled from the House 
in 2002 following his conviction for bribery; five years earlier Senator 
Bob Packwood of Oregon resigned following the recommendation of 
the Ethics Committee that he be expelled for sexual harassment and 
related misconduct. It is important to note that either chamber can 
exercise the power of expulsion without waiting for a criminal 
conviction. Thus, even though the House acted on Traficant after his 
conviction, no criminal charges had been brought against Packwood. 
The third Clause of Section 5 states that each House “shall keep a 
Journal of its Proceedings” which must be published “from time to 
time.” In an era of Internet live streaming, the daily publication of 
the Congressional Record may seem quaint. But the unequivocal 
constitutional command of transparency and public access in Article I, 
Section 5 is actually a cornerstone of American democracy. The 
Clause recognizes that secrecy might sometimes be needed, but 
moments when the C-SPAN cameras are turned off, for example when 
the Senate deliberates as a jury about articles of impeachment, are 
exceedingly rare. The Journal of each chamber is the official record of 
its proceedings, supplemented today by committee reports and many 
other forms of public access. 
This Clause also enshrines the value of public accountability: a mere 
one-fifth of the members present on the floor of either chamber may 
demand a recorded roll call vote. Roll call votes in the House are 
tallied electronically, but Senate clerks call the names of each of the 
100 members and record the outcome by hand. A Senate roll call vote 
is one of the most vivid demonstrations of representative democracy.  
The final Clause of Section 5 says that “[n]either House, during the 
Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn 
for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the 
two Houses shall be sitting.” This archaic-sounding provision is a 
necessary element of bicameralism; the Founders were worried that 
the will of one House might be thwarted by the other’s mischievous 
absence.  
House and Senate leaders typically work out a joint or concurrent 
resolution providing for adjournment, but some partisan 
gamesmanship may prevent it. For example, in 2007, Senate Majority 
Leader Harry Reid announced that the Senate would hold pro-forma 
sessions every three days so that President George W. Bush could not 
make recess appointments. In 2012, the Republican-led House 
prevented the Senate from adjourning, so that President Barack 
Obama could not make such appointments. The Supreme Court 
recently reminded the president that it is the prerogative of Congress 
to determine when it is in recess. NLRB v. Noel Canning (2014). 
Section 5 of Article 1 does not contain all of the “How To” 
instructions for legislative proceedings. The impeachment process, for 
example, is set forth in Section 3. The process for overriding 
presidential vetoes appears in Section 7. Several constitutional 
amendments have revised legislative procedures, such as the 
Seventeenth Amendment providing for the direct election of Senators. 
But Article 1, Section 5 of the Constitution is important because it 
establishes some of the most fundamental building blocks of our time-
honored system of government.  
 
